The problems of actuator fault and FDI attacks estimation, integrated security control and communication co-design were analyzed for industrial cyber-physical system (ICPS) with false data injection (FDI) attacks and actuator fault under the discrete event-triggered communication scheme (DETCS) through comprehensively using some less conservative technologies such as the Lyapunov stability theory and affine Bessel-Legendre inequality. The integrated security control architecture of ICPS under DETCS was given, and the design of the robust estimator and integrated security controller was unified in the same non-uniform data transmission mechanism by starting from the situation of actively defense attacks and considering the efficient using and reasonable allocation of communication resources and computing resources. The actuator fault and FDI attacks were expanded to the same vector. The design method of the system state and the augmented fault robust estimator was given. A separate and compensated defense strategy was adopted for FDI attacks in two-side networks of actuating and sensing based on the obtained estimation results and event trigger conditions. The method to compensate actuator fault was used for actuator failure. An integrated security controller’s design method was provided. Then the integrated security control and communication co-design of active attack and fault tolerance for FDI attacks and actuator fault were realized. The effectiveness of the proposed method was verified by the simulation of a numerical and a quadruple-tank example.