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浙江大学学报(工学版)
浙江大学学报(工学版)
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网络服务提供商合作行为的演化博弈分析
张欣欣, 徐恪, 钟宜峰, 苏辉
清华大学 计算机科学与技术系, 北京 100084
Evolutionary game analysis on cooperative behaviors of  internet service providers
ZHANG Xin-xin, XU Ke, ZHONG Yi-Feng, SU Hui
Department of Computer Science and Technology,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084, China
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摘要：

为了促进网络服务提供商之间的有效合作并合理分配资源,设计一种基于网络服务提供商之间连接关系的合作行为演化博弈方法,通过分析网络内容提供商与服务提供商之间的支付结构,得到服务提供商之间的连接策略,进而从有限理性的角度对所提方案进行综合经济效用分析,最后解释均衡结果,即在演化博弈过程中网络服务提供商之间的合作策略随关键变量如何变化.结果表明：当网络服务提供商群体处于稳定状态时,由很多利益偏好相似的小团体构成,成本控制和利润分配机制对群体的稳态有显著影响,政府或监管机构可以通过补贴或惩罚措施动态调配网络基础设施.
Abstract: An evolutionary game scheme of connection relationships was designed based on cooperation behaviors in order to promote efficient cooperation among internet service providers (ISPs) and allocate network infrastructure resources reasonably. The connection strategies were conducted among ISP groups Through analyzing the payment structure between stakeholders in the communication market like internet content providers (ICPs) and ISPs. Furthermore,a comprehensive economic utility analysis was proposed under the condition of limited rationality. Finally, the results demonstrate that when the group of ISPs is at evolutionary stable state (ESS),it is composed of small groups which share the same preference of interests. The control of costs and the allocation mechanism of profits have significant influence on the stable state of groups. The government could carry out measures like subsidy or punishment to reallocate network infrastructure resources dynamically．
出版日期: 2017-06-11
CLC:  TP 393  
基金资助:

国家自然科学基金项目(61170292,61472212);国家科技重大专项课题(2015ZX03003004);国家“973”重点基础研究发展规划基金资助项目(2012CB315803);国家“863”高技术研究发展计划基金资助项目(2013AA013302,2015AA015601);欧盟CROWN基金项目(FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES-610524).
通讯作者: 徐恪,男,教授. ORCID：0000-0003-2587-8517.     E-mail: xuke@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
作者简介: 张欣欣(1993—),女,硕士生,从事网络经济学研究. ORCID：0000-0002-0243-7842. E-mail: Zhangxinxin93@126.com
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引用本文:

张欣欣, 徐恪, 钟宜峰, 苏辉. 网络服务提供商合作行为的演化博弈分析[J]. 浙江大学学报(工学版), 10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2017.06.020.

ZHANG Xin-xin, XU Ke, ZHONG Yi-Feng, SU Hui. Evolutionary game analysis on cooperative behaviors of  internet service providers. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY (ENGINEERING SCIENCE), 10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2017.06.020.

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