Abstract：Moral progress, as a significant topic in moral philosophy and social sciences, encompasses not only the dynamic mechanisms of social norm adjustments but also the complex interplay between the evolution of social institutions and the transformation of values. This interdisciplinary nature has led scholars in ethics, sociology, and political science to investigate moral progress from their respective theoretical paradigms. However, due to fundamental differences in disciplinary backgrounds, there has been no consensus on basic issues such as research objects, methodologies, and interpretive standards. These epistemological and methodological divergences have not only resulted in the fragmentation of moral progress studies but have also left contemporary moral philosophy struggling with insufficient explanatory power when addressing the concept of progress.Currently, debates surrounding moral progress mainly manifest in three aspects: the subject controversy, which involves the tension between groups and individuals; the relativism controversy, which addresses the universality of progress standards; and the model controversy, which concerns the driving factors of moral progress. The absence of a unified ontological and epistemological foundation, along with a coherent methodological framework, makes it difficult for existing ethical studies to resolve the incompatibility of moral subjects or to provide a universally applicable theoretical framework for assessing and promoting moral progress in cross-cultural contexts. This dual predicament underscores the urgent need for a breakthrough from a new philosophical perspective, seeking to resolve disciplinary disputes through the construction of a coherent metatheory of moral progress.From a metaethical perspective, extending ethical theoretical disputes to metatheoretical issues reveals that the subject and relativism controversies reflect the existential questions of moral progress, including: (1) Does moral progress require a commitment to moral realism? (2) Does moral anti-realism necessarily negate the existence of moral progress? The relativism and model controversies, on the other hand, reflect the standards and epistemological issues of moral progress, including: (3) What is the meaning of morality in moral progress? (4) How does moral pluralism affect the standards of moral progress? (5) Is moral progress knowable, and what factors interfere with its recognition? (6) If moral progress is knowable, how should the legitimacy of current moral concepts be determined? (7) If moral progress is knowable, what methods should be used to observe and measure it? These questions form the problem domain of the metatheory of moral progress, which not only integrates the fragmented research landscape and provides a systematic framework for understanding moral progress but also establishes a methodological foundation for analyzing and evaluating the rationality of different theories of moral progress.The construction of the problem domain provides normative guidance for the metatheory. Specifically, a metatheory of moral progress should first clarify the concept of moral progress under a specified realist or anti-realist stance. Second, it should propose an inclusive standard of progress within the framework of moral pluralism. Finally, it should provide methodological support for recognizing and measuring moral progress. Examining existing views on moral progress through this problem domain reveals that while reductionist, functionalist, and pragmatist explanatory approaches can address certain aspects of the issue, they fail to effectively distinguish between theoretical disputes and metatheoretical concerns, thereby suffering from explanatory limitations. Modest naturalism, as an emerging explanatory approach, not only avoids the realist controversy in moral progress but also effectively addresses the existential problem of moral progress and the challenges posed by moral pluralism. Moreover, it offers concrete proposals for recognizing moral progress, making it a more suitable foundation and framework for constructing a metatheory of moral progress.
殷杰, 刘伟凡. 道德进步的元理论探析[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2025, 55(7): 106-118.
Yin Jie, Liu Weifan. An Exploration of the Metatheory of Moral Progress. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2025, 55(7): 106-118.
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