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浙江大学学报(工学版)
自动化技术、通信工程     
基于攻击增益的工业控制系统物理层安全风险评估
梁耀,冯冬芹
浙江大学 智能系统与控制研究所 工业控制技术国家重点实验室,浙江 杭州 310027
Security risks assessment for physical layer of industrial control system based on attack gain
LIANG Yao, FENG Dong qin
Institute of Cyber Systems and Control,State Key Laboratory of Industrial Control Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
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摘要:

通过借鉴多输入多输出(MIMO)系统中变量配对的思想,基于相对增益阵列(RGA)设计衡量闭环状态下每个输出对不同攻击输入的敏感程度的指标,即闭环攻击增益矩阵.结合逼近理想解(TOPSIS)法,提出定量分析工业控制系统物理层安全风险的评估方法.通过精馏塔实验平台的案例分析,直观地展现攻击效果,验证闭环攻击增益矩阵的正确性,得出控制回流比的设备区域在该控制系统物理层中安全风险最大.实验结果表明,该评估方法能较全面地结合被控对象的客观属性,科学合理地量化评估工业控制系统物理层中潜在的安全风险.

Abstract:

Inspired by variable pairing applied in the multiple input and multiple output (MIMO) system, an indicator was raised to measure the sensitivity of each output to different attack inputs under close loop conditions based on relative gain array (RGA), such as close loop attack gain array. Combined with technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), an assessment method  was proposed  to quantitatively analyze security risks in the physical layer of an industrial control system. The attack impact was presented intuitively, the correctness of close loop attack gain array above was verified, and the area related to reflux ratio was found at most risks in the physical layer based on the case study of a rectifying tower testbed. Results show that the proposed assessment method can combine objective attributes of the controlled object more comprehensively, making a quantitative asessment of potential security risks that exist in the physical layer of an industrial control system scientifically and reasonably.

出版日期: 2016-09-18
:  TP 11  
基金资助:

国家自然科学基金资助项目(61223004);工业控制系统安全脆弱性分析与建模的理论与应用研究.

通讯作者: 冯冬芹,男,教授,博导,ORCID:0000 0002 3034 0933.      E-mail: dqfeng@iipc.zju.edu.cn
作者简介: 梁耀(1993-),男,硕士生,从事工业控制系统安全分析研究,ORCID:0000 0002 5505 0633.E-mail:liangyaoxp@zju.edu.cn
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梁耀,冯冬芹. 基于攻击增益的工业控制系统物理层安全风险评估[J]. 浙江大学学报(工学版), 10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2016.03.025.

LIANG Yao, FENG Dong qin. Security risks assessment for physical layer of industrial control system based on attack gain. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY (ENGINEERING SCIENCE), 10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2016.03.025.

链接本文:

http://www.zjujournals.com/eng/CN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2016.03.025        http://www.zjujournals.com/eng/CN/Y2016/V50/I3/589

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