Please wait a minute...
J4  2010, Vol. 44 Issue (9): 1687-1691    DOI: 10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2010.09.010
    
Research on incentive penalty model in computational grids
LIU Duan-yang1 , CAO Yan-long2
1.College of Computer Science, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310032, China;
2. Department of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
Download:   PDF(0KB) HTML
Export: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      

Abstract  

The penalty policies on incentives were researched to restrict malicious and dishonest participants in computational grids,ensure incentives effectiveness, and satisfy various penalty needs of grids. Based on analysis of the old simple method, this work introduced power functions and proposed a new flexible penalty model, which could flexibly modulate a parameter, and agree with different penalty needs and dynamic computing environment. Furthermore,  this model was introduced  into the  mechanism design theory, and a penalty principal was defined according to the volunteer participation condition, based on which a specific grid scheduling problem was resolved. Simulation experiments demonstrated the flexibility of power functions in different penalty cases, and proved the models correctness and effectiveness.



Published: 01 September 2010
CLC:  TP 393.4  
Cite this article:

LIU Duan-Yang, CAO Yan-Long. Research on incentive penalty model in computational grids. J4, 2010, 44(9): 1687-1691.

URL:

http://www.zjujournals.com/eng/10.3785/j.issn.1008-973X.2010.09.010     OR     http://www.zjujournals.com/eng/Y2010/V44/I9/1687


计算网格中激励惩罚模型的研究

在计算网格中,为了约束不诚实的参与者,保证激励的有效性,满足计算网格多样性的惩罚需求,对激励的惩罚问题进行了深入研究.在分析原有简单方法的基础上,引入了幂函数模型,提出了新的具有高灵活性的惩罚模型.新模型可以灵活地调整参数,适应不同的惩罚需求和动态变化的计算环境.同时,在机制设计理论中,引入了这个惩罚模型,并根据志愿参与条件,定义了惩罚原则,并采用该惩罚模型和惩罚原则,解决了一个实际的网格调度问题.通过模拟实验和仿真结果,阐述了幂函数惩罚模型适合各类不同惩罚需求的灵活性,从而验证模型的正确性和有效性.

[1] FOSTER I, KESSELMAN C. The anatomy of the grid: enabling scalable virtual organizations [J]. International Journal of Supercomputer Applications, 2001,15(3): 200222.
[2] CHUANG J. Designing incentive mechanisms for peertopeer systems [C]∥ Proceedings of the 1st IEEE International Workshop on Grid Economics and Business Models. Seoul, Korea : IEEE Computer Society, 2004: 6781.
[3] BARMOUTA A, BUYYA R. GridBank: a grid accounting services architecture (GASA) for distributed systems sharing and integration [C]∥ Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium. Nice, France : IEEE Computer Society, 2003: 245256.
[4] ELMROTH E, GARDFJLL P, MULMO O, et al. An OGSAbased bank service for grid accounting systems [C]∥Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Applied Parallel Computing. Stateoftheart in Scientific Computing. Lyngby, Denmark : Springer Verlag, 2004: 10511060.
[5] XIAO Lijuan, ZHU Yanmin, NI L M, et al. GridIS: an incentivebased grid scheduling [C]∥ Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium. Denver, Colorado,USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2005: 6572.
[6] ZHU Yanmin, HAN Jinsong, LIU Yunhao, et al. TruGrid: a selfsustaining trustworthy grid [C]∥ Proceeding of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops 2005. Columbus, Ohio, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2005: 815821.
[7] PARAIOANNOU T G, STAMOULIS G D. Effective use of reputation in peertopeer environments [C]∥ Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid. Chicago, Illinois, USA : IEEE Computer Society, 2004:259268.
[8] PARAIOANNOU T G, STAMOULIS G D. An incentives mechanism promoting truthful feedback in peertopeer systems [C]∥ Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid. Cardiff, UK: IEEE Computer Society, 2005: 275283.
[9] OSBORNE M, RUBINSTEIN A. A course in game theory [M]. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA : MIT Press, 1994.
[10] BUYYA R, ABRAMSON D, GIDDY J. A case for economy grid architecture for serviceoriented grid computing [C]∥ Proceeding of the 10th IEEE Heterogeneous Computing. San Francisco, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2001: 776790.
[11] WOLSKI R, PLANK J S, BRYAN T, et al. Gcommerce: market formulations controlling resource allocation on the computational grid [C]∥ Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium.San Francisco, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2001: 4653.
[12] GROSU D, CHRONOPOULOS A T. Algorithmic mechanism design for load balancing in distributed systems [C]∥ Proceedings of the 4th IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing. Berlin, Germany: IEEE Computer Society, 2002: 445450.
[13] GROSU D, CHRONOPOULOS A T. A load balancing mechanism with verification [C]∥ Proceedings of the 17th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium. Nice, France : IEEE Computer Society, 2003: 163170.
[14] NISAN N, RONEN A. Algorithmic mechanism design [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 35(1): 166196.
[15] ARCHER A and TARDOS E. Truthful mechanism for oneparameter agents [C]∥ Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. Las Vegas, Nevada, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2001: 482491.

[1] LIU Duan-yang , Xie Jian-ping, CAO Yan-long. Research on divisible load scheduling algorithm based on energy model[J]. J4, 2013, 47(9): 1547-1553.