Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack was defended by distributed filtering. Distributed defense was restricted inside autonomous system (AS), which was a suitable bound for defense. Both bandwidth and processing capability of victim were considered. The filtering threshold was dynamically adjusted in AS edge according to the throughput of victim in support vector machine (SVM)-based multi-resource max-min fairness (SMMF) algorithm. Then SMMF achieved multi-resource max-min fairness and was much effective. Simulation results demonstrate that attacking traffic can be depressed in a common scenario and the legitimate throughput can be kept in a normal level when current methods fail. A realization of filters on PC-based router indicates that only a very small amount of memory is needed and the packet throughput is still normal when thousands of filters are installed.
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