Under the influence of the Greek philosophical idea which stresses the direct opposition between ″freedom″ and ″necessity″ on the one hand and confuses ″freedom″ with ″chanciness″ on the other, Augustine holds that ″free-will″ could make people voluntarily seek good or do evil by chance. This viewpoint has a great impact on the dichotomical structure between ″free-will″ and ″determinism″ set up by the later mainstream of Western philosophy, and often misleads quite a few masters into drawing an absurd conclusion that doubts or even negates the real existence of free-will. In terms of the semantic identity of the word, ″will″ is both a noun and a verb. It contains analytically in itself the meaning of ″freedom″ as ″doing whatever one wants to do″ and thus forms the basic motivation for everyone to take action in order to acquire ″actual freedom″ in real life. Therefore, the existence of ″free-will″ as a simple fact of human life is undeniable, otherwise we have to negate the existence of the will itself as well as of the whole human life. If we introduce the concepts of ″good and evil″ into the discussion as Augustine does and define them respectively in the broadest senses of ″beneficial and desirable″ and ″harmful and detestable″, as many philosophers do, we may safely argue that, viewed from the perspectives both of semantic analysis and of factual description, it is not possible at all for ″free-will″ to voluntarily seek good or do evil by chance; rather, everyone's free-will always follows the inner logic of human nature so that one could only seek whatever is good for oneself and avoid whatever is evil for oneself. The popular viewpoint that ″free-will″ could make people voluntarily seek good or do evil by chance results mainly from people's distortion of the meta-axiological logic of human nature by their own normative standard of good and evil. When someone regards other persons' action taken according to their own normative standards as ″abnormally doing evil and rejecting good″ according to his/her own normative standard, virtually, he/she would totally deny the fact that other persons also have their own free-will of ″seeking whatever is good for themselves and avoiding whatever is evil for themselves.″ Indeed, people still inevitably meet some evils when they take action motivated by their free-will of seeking good and avoiding evil in real life. Nevertheless, the key reason for it is not that people voluntarily do evil motivated by their free-will, but is the so-called ″paradoxical structure of interweaving good and evil″ brought about by the conflict of diverse goods: people have to abandon the less important good in order to acquire the more important good in the conflict, and thereby necessarily and passively meet some evil resulting from the very abandonment. That is also why the actual freedom people obtain in real life is always limited and relative, not infinite and absolute. Therefore, we could explain the complex mechanism of how people achieve the actual freedom based on their free-will in the conflict of diverse goods only in virtue of the necessary logic of human nature of ″seeking good and avoiding evil.″