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| "Ziran" as the Core Category and Its Manifestation of the Distinctive Features of Taoist Philosophy |
| Kong Linghong |
| School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China |
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Abstract In recent years, Chinese philosophers have been advocating a departure from the practice of comparing philosophy with Western philosophy, focusing instead on the exploration and systematic organization of the original concepts and categories of Chinese philosophy, and emphasizing the construction of an autonomous discourse system in the field of humanities and social sciences. Against this background, the concept of “ziran” (自然, nature) in Chinese philosophy has attracted the attention of scholars and hundreds of papers have been published. Some scholars have pointed out that “ziran” possesses rich philosophical implications within the context of a philosophical system, but it lacks specific elaboration. This paper attempts to explore its implications. The connotation of “ziran” in Taoist philosophy can be summarized as by itself, naturally; inherently; usually so, always; normally; naturally occurring; inevitable; certainly. Unlike the established academic discussion of it, this paper argues that it is not an ordinary concept of the Taoist philosophical system, but rather one of the core categories, holding significance that runs through the entire system. In Taoism, ontology is the category that explains everything in the philosophical system without proof, and “ziran” is one of the four fundamental properties of ontology and occupies a central position in it, connecting metaphysical and physical realm, manifesting itself as absoluteness in the metaphysical realm and in the physical realm as relativity. In the theory of disposition, “ziran” refers to the original state in an unconscious condition. Within the realm of values, “ziran” signifies the recognition and evaluation of one’s inherent state, which serves both descriptive and normative functions. Things are the basis of one’s own value, and do not need to be measured against external standards of other things, and are thus necessarily self-recognized and self-affirmed. Taoist relative “ziran” is primarily a recognition of and respect for a plurality of knowledge and values. In practice theory, “ziran” is transformed by value theory into practice theory and then presented as the principle of human behavior—wuwei (non-action). The use of “ziran” in practice theory mainly involves managing the relationship between humans and the external world as well as addressing the internal relationship between body and mind within individuals. The domain concerning the former is the theory of objects, the core of which is to follow the internal nature of things, and there are two kinds of specific approaches：by following the natural course of things, and by guiding and assisting the natural development of things; the latter pertains to the realms of ethical and political philosophy. The core of Taoist ethical philosophy is virtue, and the original meaning of virtue is not to destroy the “ziran” of others and other things. Taoist political philosophy takes “ziran” as its basic value. In dealing with the internal relationship between mind and body within human beings, Taoism advocates maintaining the “ziran” of the mind, and the manifestation of “ziran”-based values is the ideal personality. The result of knowledge and practice is expressed in the realm of the individual. “ziran” is the basic value that guides the construction and enhancement of the realm. Accordingly, the realm can be divided into four levels from low to high: “ziran” of freedom, “ziran” of self-activity, “ziran” of inaction, and “ziran” of self-cause. “Freedom” is the external manifestation of the individual in the state of “ziran” and the way in which the individual realizes “ziran” , according to which the realm can be categorized into non-freedom, relative freedom and absolute freedom. “ziran” highlights the characteristics of Taoism’s philosophy of non-substantiality from the internal aspect, but also from the external aspect, in contrast with Confucianism and Buddhism, and it is also an ideological clue for sorting out the history of Taoism’s interaction with Confucianism and Buddhism. In short, “ziran” is one of the important categories of Taoist philosophy and Chinese philosophy. The elaboration of the “systematic meaning” of “ziran” has undoubtedly enriched the connotation of Taoist philosophy, and it has also provided an opportunity to continue the ancient Taoist philosophy “downward”, to make a global comparison of Chinese and Western philosophies in the contemporary era, and to make Taoist thought “ancient for modern use” for the future. It also provides an alternative path for the construction of a new Taoist philosophical system by “applying the ancient to the modern”.
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Received: 09 September 2024
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2026, Vol. 56 
