Abstract How should behavior be taken in a divided world in order to promote the foundations of human life together? On this issue, a number of behavioral theories have been formed in the field of contemporary political philosophy, among which John Rawls’s theory of rational behavior and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative behavior have far-reaching influence. By contrast, Rawls’s rational behavior is a monologue logical analysis of the behavioral subject, embedded in the principles of justice, and therefore it is essentially equivalent to the principles of justice in which behavior has been programmed, while Habermas’s communicative behavior is a linguistic communication between behavior subjects, which is independent of the principles of justice and can produce any substantive principle within the framework of the negotiation it establishes. These two behavioral theories are different from the theory of class struggle and the theory of strategic behavior. They are devoted to the study of the rationality of human behavior and the rationalization of society in a divided world and provide peaceful solutions to the conflicts of human interests and values, and even promote the basis for human beings to live together.However, these two behavioral theories are based on a set of counterfactual hypotheses respectively. As ideal theories, they do not pay enough attention to the transition between ideal theory and reality. And they both have a tendency of universalism that causes them to neglect the boundary issue of universalism as well as the issue of multiple relations between the boundaries. Therefore, these two behavioral theories are not only difficult to be applied directly to the divided and conflicting real world, but also lead to improper interference in the process of seeking homogeneous consensus. In the critical study of these two behavioral theories, a new kind of behavior theory, namely theory of interactive behavior, has been outlined, in which the reinterpreted rational behavior theory and the communicative behavior theory constitutes the two basic aspects of the interactive behavior theory, that is, the institutional aspect which contains many different rank principles and the behavioral aspect which contains many kinds of interactive activities.As a behavioral paradigm, interactive behavior is different from rational behavior and communicative behavior in three aspects: firstly, the starting point of interactive behavior is the realistic relationship that can be improved, which is neither the hypothetical original state nor the ideal debate situation; secondly, interactive behavior recognizes the boundary of universalism and pays attention to the multiple relational attributes between the boundaries; thirdly, the form of thought behind the interactive behavior is the emotional rationality that pays attention to the boundary, and it is neither purpose-cognitive rationality nor communicative rationality without boundary consciousness. Because the interactive behavior starts with a realistic relationship that can be improved, seeking the possibility of cooperation between boundaries rather than seeking homogeneity or unity that across all boundaries, it not only avoids shrinking into monologue-like logical analysis but also avoids completely drowning out the relational attributes among the principles; and it seeks the interactive consensus among the boundaries by gradually improving the conditions that prevent consensus from being reached. Interactive consensus gives up the pursuit of homogeneous consensus focus and seeks to converge the overlapping areas of heterogeneous consensus focus to form a network of compatibility consensus, and thus consolidate the foundation for human beings to live together.
Qin Zizhong. Rationality of Behavior and Its Boundary: Interactive Behavior Between Multiple Relationships[J]. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2023, 53(5): 147-160.
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