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浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)  2015, Vol. 1 Issue (3): 68-83    DOI: 10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.2014.07.172
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投资者不参与投票: 信息不对称还是利益不相关
汪炜 叶建宏
Investors Do Not Participate in the Vote:Information Asymmetry or Benefit Independency
Wang Wei Ye Jianhong

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摘要 

投资者针对股东大会的各项议案进行表决投票,是股东权利保护的重要机制,也是中小股东参与公司治理的重要方式。利用深圳证券交易所上市公司股东大会投票数据,可证实投票议案的信息不对称程度和利益相关性是投资者参与投票的重要动因。投资者参与投票建立在投票信息被市场关注的基础上,利益相关性不会影响市场关注度较低的议案。进一步地,按照投票前股票异常收益率区分“好议案”与“坏议案”,“坏议案”弃权率仅受市场关注度影响,而利益相关性与“好议案”的弃权率显著负相关,表明投资者面对“坏议案”的投票信息会选择“用脚投票”方式卖出股份,以降低预期损失,而积极参与“好议案”投票。

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汪炜 叶建宏
关键词 投资者投票弃权率信息不对称利益不相关股东大会股东权利    
Abstract

The average shareholding proportion of the largest shareholders in Chinese listed companies exceeds 30%,and majority shareholders can make decisions directly based on superiority of control rights,while rights of minority shareholders are often ignored .To protect minority shareholders' rights,China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has guided the listed companies to implement internet voting system for shareholders' meeting,and encouraged minority shareholders to participate in corporate governance through attending shareholders' meeting .Up to now,the network voting practice has been carried out for nearly 10 years and the voting mechanism has been improved greatly .However,voting rates of shareholders' meetings are not high,and a large number of minority shareholders abstain from voting .Why have voting participation rates not increased while internet voting system for shareholders' meeting has improved ?Which factors affect the voting behavior of the minority shareholders ?There are few literatures focusing on minority shareholders participating in corporate governance,and researches on abstention behavior of minority shareholders have not been fully developed yet . Using the shareholders' meeting voting data of the companies listed on Shenzhen Securities Exchange from 2007 2012,this paper analyzes the factors affecting abstention rates of shareholders' meeting and reveals the internal mechanism of the shareholders' abstaining from voting . The empirical results show as follows:(1 ) reflecting the degree of information asymmetry index of voting resolutions″market attention″and benefit dependency index are two important factors for investors' participating in the vote . That resolution information of shareholders' meetings is open to the public can help reduce abstention rates,and investors can be driven by their benefit to participate in the vote .(2)Investors'participation in the vote is based on resolutions being concerned by the market .Abstention rates are high,even if resolutions relates to the rights of investors,unless the voting information is observed by investors .That is to say,benefit dependency can only influence voting rates of resolutions that draw high market attention . (3) According to the cumulative abnormal returns before the vote,resolutions are divided into two types,″good resolution″and″bad resolution .″The factors influencing abstention rates of these two types differ greatly . The benefit dependency has significantly negative impact on abstention rate of″good resolution,″but the impact of market attention on abstention rates is not significant .While market attention has significantly negative impact on abstention rates of″bad resolution,″ and benefit dependency has no significant influence on abstention rates . (4)Accordingly,based on analysis and conclusion,this paper provides policy suggestions about minority shareholders participating in shareholders' meeting . The innovative points of this paper are as follows:from the perspective of information asymmetry and benefit dependency of resolutions,this paper analyzes voting behavior of minority shareholders and their motivations . In order to explore the abstention behavior of minority shareholders properly,this paper uses the abstention rates data .Resolutions are divided″good resolution″and″bad resolution,″and different influences on these two types between information asymmetry and benefit dependency are compared .Quantile regression (QR) method is used to get reasonable conclusions . Since the conclusions of this paper focus on minority shareholders' participation in corporate governance,it deepens the theoretical research on the protection of minority shareholders' rights .

Key wordsinvestors    voting abstention rate    asymmetric information    benefit independency    shareholders' meeting    shareholders' rights   
    
引用本文:   
汪炜 叶建宏. 投资者不参与投票: 信息不对称还是利益不相关[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2015, 1(3): 68-83. Wang Wei Ye Jianhong. Investors Do Not Participate in the Vote:Information Asymmetry or Benefit Independency. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2015, 1(3): 68-83.
链接本文:  
https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.2014.07.172     或     https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/Y2015/V1/I3/68
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