Abstract：The dynamics of vertical interdepartmental relations offer a critical lens through which to examine institutional change in Chinese public administration. Existing literature, however, has paid insufficient attention to shifts in the relative strength of tiao (vertical bureaucratic lines) and kuai (horizontal territorial units) within the jurisdictional management framework, particularly with regard to how the influence of higher-level departmental guidance authority and local governmental administrative authority over functional departments expands and contracts over time. The adjustment of vertical relationships within the Departments of Government Offices Administration provides an illuminating case for investigating how vertical linkage emerges as an organizational phenomenon. Historically, the Departments of Government Offices Administration focused on serving their respective levels of government, and their vertical relationships remained relatively loose. In recent years, however, they have placed increasing emphasis on strengthening vertical linkage across hierarchical levels. Drawing on the case of Province S, we collected case data through semi-structured interviews, fieldwork, and multi-channel secondary sources. The data were then analyzed using the framework analysis method.
The emergence of vertical linkage mechanisms is rooted in the problems generated under conditions of loose vertical relationships. As the demands of state governance and the operating environment of functional departments change, their functions, authority structures, working mechanisms, and governance tools also shift. This creates a growing mismatch between established administrative arrangements and actual departmental practice. To resolve this mismatch, tiao exerts a growing influence over functional departments, driving the dynamic evolution of tiao-kuai relationships within the jurisdictional management framework. Four types of institutional arrangements and actions, along with their interactions, constitute the institutional logic underlying the transformation of the government operation guarantee system. The first concerns legitimacy consolidation and functional adaptation: as potential legitimacy deficits emerge, the institutional importance of administrative functions rises accordingly. The second concerns the redistribution of control rights and structural optimization: through the upward recentralization of control rights, the authority structure of the government operation guarantee system is reconfigured. The third concerns a stronger performance orientation and mechanism rea series of institutional mechanisms are reconstructed around more demanding performance objectives. The fourth concerns digital governance and technological embeddedness: by reducing information asymmetry, digital tools provide the technical infrastructure that sustains and enables vertical linkage. These four constituent elements of institutional logic interact through relations of nesting, symbiosis, conflict, and resolution. Legitimacy consolidation provides the foundation for nested institutional arrangements, while technological embeddedness serves as an operational fulcrum for the co-evolution of action mechanisms. At the same time, two types of tension emerge: one between legitimacy pressures and certain performance pressures, and the other between changes in authority structures and constraints on technological resources. Both are alleviated through strategic measures.
By integrating state and societal perspectives and considering both internal and external factors, this study explains the causes and mechanisms underlying the transition from loose vertical relationships to robust vertical linkage within the jurisdictional management framework. The findings offer new theoretical insights into vertical intergovernmental relations and contemporary administrative reform in China. The dynamic evolution of tiao-kuai relationships in government departments is not always driven by efforts to resolve the inherent contradictions of the authoritarian regime; it may equally serve to consolidate organizational legitimacy or to protect departmental interests. Furthermore, the study identifies a distinctive form of atypical jurisdictional management characterized by loose vertical relationships, and examines its connection to the nature of the public affairs it governs.
Beyond the established categories of affairs concerned with governing the populace and controlling bureaucrats, there is a third, intermediate type that may be termed quasi-public affairs. Government operation guarantee is a paradigmatic example of this type.
