Abstract：Temporary laws are those that incorporates a sunset clause specifying its own expiration or repeal date, and they are manifested in diverse forms in the legislative practices. The study of temporary legislation holds significant theoretical and practical value. In-depth research on its functions can enrich and perfect legislative theory, deepen the understanding of the diverse forms of legislation and their mechanisms, and fill the gap in the existing academic literature regarding the "temporary" element of temporary legislation. From a practical perspective, by analyzing the functions of temporary legislation, we can provide theoretical guidance for its use in China and other countries, thereby promoting the development of the rule-of-law practice. This article comprehensively employs the methods of comparative research and case study. The comparative research is reflected in the comparative analysis of the temporary legislation practices in China and Western countries, summarizing the commonalities and differences of temporary legislation in different countries, so as to refine the general functional characteristics of temporary legislation. The use of case analysis method is reflected in the selection of representative cases such as the enactment of interim regulations and authorized legislation in China since the reform and opening-up, as well as the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in the United States, to deeply analyze the specific application of temporary legislation in these cases as well as the functions it demonstrates. The core concern of the article is the internal and external functions of temporary legislation. The internal functions of temporary legislation are mainly reflected in acquiring new legislative information, building legislative consensus, regulating frequently changing matters, and promoting the optimization of social rules. First, it can acquire new legislative information. Through phased implementation, it can obtain valuable information in a timely manner for its use in the next stage of legislation, including correcting errors and deviations, eliminating cognitive biases, and reducing information asymmetry. Second, it helps to build legislative consensus. When there is controversy within the legislative body, it serves as a compromise product to break the deadlock and expand the space for seeking common ground while reserving differences. Third, it can regulate frequently changing matters and temporary matters, such as dealing with sudden social crises, filling the vacuum in the legal system, and alleviating the impact of drastic legislative changes. Fourth, it can promote the optimization of social rules. Faced with suboptimal equilibrium states such as bad customs, temporary legislation can break the balance through legislative means and promote the development of social rules in a better direction. The external functions of temporary legislation are mainly manifested in political functions and rule- of- law functions. In terms of political functions, the temporal legislation can adjust the power allocation between state institutions, enhance the democratic nature of the legal system, accelerate the renewal of the legal system, and reflect the will of contemporary people. It can also reshape the relationship between the legislative and administrative institutions, strengthen the legislature’s supervision over the administrative institutions, and curb the expansion of these institutions.At the same time, it adjusts the relationship between the current and the future legislative institutions, affecting the distribution of legislative planning power. In terms of the rule of law functions, temporary legislation promotes the implementation of legislative principles. Although it has potential tension with the principles of stability and equal treatment, if used properly, it will not only not erode these principles, but also better practice them. For example, it can serve as an important means to maintain the dynamic balance of the legal system and enhance the stability of the legal system in the specific periods and regions.
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