“软权力”约束下的“抵制—协商”：基层斜向府际关系的一种互动模式——对 B 市 C 区社会救助审批权下放改革的实证研究
杨立雄、雷妮妮
“Resistance-Negotiation” Under the Constraint of “Soft Power”: An Interactive Mode between Grass-roots Oblique Governments
—An Empirical Study on the Decentralization Reform of Social Assistance Approval Authority in District C of B City
Abstract：Intergovernmental interactions have always been a focal point of academic research. However, scholars mostly focus on the “central-local” intergovernmental interactions in the vertical dimension as well as the interdepartmental interactions in the horizontal dimension, so that the research on oblique intergovernmental interactions is limited. The first author of this paper made use of the convenience of serving as head of the expert group on the decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority in District C of B City, interviewed 11 staff members from the Civil Affairs Bureau (CAB) and four sub-district offices, and attended seminars and symposiums hosted by the CAB. After getting authorization from the CAB, the authors analyzed these materials.
In 2019, the District C of B City initiated a decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority, which aimed at delegating the social assistance approval authority from the CAB to sub-district offices of District C. As a result, the responsibility of the former was reduced, while the risk and workload of the latter was increased. Thus, this reform was vehemently opposed by the sub-district offices through the following ways: (1) “Persistent claiming”. The sub-district offices made use of various occasions and opportunities to express their concerns and difficulties, so as to halt or delay the reform. (2) Strategically “intimidating”. The sub-district offices requested that the CAB amend certain provisions of the reform scheme, or they would withdraw from the reform pilot. (3) Conditionally “compromise”. After some of their concerns were satisfied, the sub-district offices expressed their support for the reform. In the face of the resistance from the sub-district offices, measures were taken by the CAB which included: (1) “Taking advantage of the authority from superior leaders”. A reform team was established headed by the main leaders of District C and the leaders of B City were invited to attend mobilization and deployment meetings. (2) “Irreconcilable (one plays the hero while the other plays the villain in Chinese context)”. The director of the CAB made pushing demands at formal meetings and exerted administrative and political pressures on the sub-district offices, while the deputy director held heart-to-heart conversations with them in some informal situations explaining the urgency of the reform to receive support from the sub-district offices. (3) “Compromise”. The CAB gathered opinions from sub-district offices and adopted some reasonable suggestions. (4) “Buy out”. The CAB arranged for the major leaders of the sub-district offices on an official visit to other districts to win over their understanding and recognition. In the process of decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority in District C, the interactions between sub-district offices and the CAB do not present a “command-obedience” or “competition-conflict” mode as in the traditional intergovernmental interactions. The major reason can be attributed to the urban grassroots governance mechanism reform of B City. Since 2017, B City has explored a grass-roots governance model named “sub-district offices and township governments whistle, agencies report for duty”, which endows sub-district offices with authority to command, dispatch, and evaluate its upper-level departments, and enhances their coordinating capability in urban grass-roots governance, thus power distribution between the sub-district offices and the CAB is balanced to some extent. The discourse power of the sub-district offices is enhanced during the decentralization reform of social assistance approval authority through undertaking authority from their upper-level governments and becoming the new center of grassroots social governance. Therefore, an interactive model of oblique intergovernmental interactions characterized by “resistance-negotiation” comes into being.
杨立雄、雷妮妮. “软权力”约束下的“抵制—协商”：基层斜向府际关系的一种互动模式——对 B 市 C 区社会救助审批权下放改革的实证研究[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 0, (): 1-.
Yang Lixiong Lei Nini. “Resistance-Negotiation” Under the Constraint of “Soft Power”: An Interactive Mode between Grass-roots Oblique Governments
—An Empirical Study on the Decentralization Reform of Social Assistance Approval Authority in District C of B City. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 0, (): 1-.
