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浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)  2014, Vol. 44 Issue (1): 125-133    DOI: 10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.2012.06.021
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感受质、意识体验的主体性与自我意识
朱耀平
Qualia, Subjectivity and Self-Awareness
Zhu Yaoping

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摘要 

意识体验及其中的感受质之所以是不可还原的,原因并不在于“意识”像笛卡儿所认为的那样是不同于物质实体的另外一种实体,而在于它的主体性,意识体验的主体性是造成物理主义、表象主义和外在主义最终失败的根本原因。主体性是解开意识体验及其感受质的不可还原性这个心灵哲学难解之谜的钥匙。意识体验的主体性是指它除了以第一人称的方式向“我”显现之外,不可能以别的方式向他人显现,即意识体验总是作为“我的意识体验”、以“被我意识到”的方式存在。就此而言,任何意识体验都隐含着某种程度的自我意识。与反思—高阶理论把自我意识看作第二位的反思行为的结果不同的是,胡塞尔把自我意识看作是内在于意识体验之中的前反思、非对象化、不自觉的意识。海德格尔和萨特等人认为,体验的有意识地被给予不是体验的某种附加的性质,而是体验的存在方式。正如空间中的物体是以三维的方式存在,体验只能作为自我意识存在。

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朱耀平
关键词 感受质意识体验主体性自我意识胡塞尔海德格尔萨特    
Abstract

How to eliminate ''the explanatory gap''between human's conscious experiences and his brain's physiology? This is the hard problem in the area of the mind-body relationship as well as the central issue of contemporary philosophy of mind. The irreducibility of conscious experiences and qualia originates from their subjectivity, which means that they could be experienced only from the first-person perspective instead of the third-person perspective. It is the neglect of the subjectivity of conscious experiences that causes the failing of Functionalism and Representationalism. Subjectivity is the key to eliminate the mystery of consciousness. Whereas the object of my perceptual experience is intersubjectively accessible, my perceptual experience itself is only given directly to me. It is this first-personal givenness of the experience that makes it subjective. Consciousness is self-luminous. It is characterized by intentionality. Being intentionally aware of objects is simultaneously self-aware through and in itself. Its self-awareness is not due to a secondary act or reflex but is a constitutive moment of experience itself. Despite his criticism of the reflection theory, Brentano continues to speak of consciousness, taking itself as its own object, and self-awareness as a secondary object-awareness. Husserl does not deny the existence of a tacit self-awareness. But he does deny that this self-awareness can provide us with more than awareness. The actual life and lived-experiencing is of course always conscious, but it is not therefore always thematically experienced and known. According to Heidegger, any worldly experiencing is characterized by the fact that ''I am always somehow acquainted with myself''and this basic familiarity with oneself does not take the form of a reflective self-perception or a thematic self-observation, nor does it involve any kind of self-objectification. For Sartre, the conscious givenness of the experience is not simply a quality added to experience, but the very mode of being of the experience. Just as an extended object can only exist three dimensionally, an experience can only exist as self-aware.

Key wordsqualia    conscious experiences    subjectivity    self-awareness    E.Husserl    M.Heidegger    J.P. Sartre   
    
引用本文:   
朱耀平. 感受质、意识体验的主体性与自我意识[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2014, 44(1): 125-133. Zhu Yaoping. Qualia, Subjectivity and Self-Awareness. , 2014, 44(1): 125-133.
链接本文:  
https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.2012.06.021     或     https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/CN/Y2014/V44/I1/125
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