Please wait a minute...
FITEE
Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng.  2010, Vol. 11 Issue (12): 967-975    DOI: 10.1631/jzus.C0910727
    
An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks
Bo-wei Yang, Guang-hua Song, Yao Zheng
Center for Engineering and Scientific Computation, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China, School of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China, School of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks
Bo-wei Yang, Guang-hua Song, Yao Zheng
Center for Engineering and Scientific Computation, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China, School of Computer Science and Technology, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China, School of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310027, China
 全文: PDF 
摘要： We propose an incentive model based on information-hiding to encourage peers to vote for resources in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. The following are key motives for our model: (1) Some trust and reputation systems have been deployed in modern P2P systems, but a lot of blank rating resources exist in these P2P systems; (2) E-commerce consumer-to-consumer (C2C) websites that adopt simple rating strategies are receiving accusations that false and useless ratings are flooded. We establish an information-hiding based RRR/RIR (resource reputation rating/reputation incentive rating) voting model, which awards or punishes voters according to their behaviors. The RRR generating algorithm and the RIR generating algorithm are presented in detail, and the information-hiding mechanism is given. Experimental results showed that the incentive RRR/RIR model can effectively encourage valid voting and prevent malicious or arbitrary voting in the P2P reputation system.
关键词： Peer-to-peer (P2P);  Information-hiding;  Incentive;  Blank voting;  Reputation system    
Abstract: We propose an incentive model based on information-hiding to encourage peers to vote for resources in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. The following are key motives for our model: (1) Some trust and reputation systems have been deployed in modern P2P systems, but a lot of blank rating resources exist in these P2P systems; (2) E-commerce consumer-to-consumer (C2C) websites that adopt simple rating strategies are receiving accusations that false and useless ratings are flooded. We establish an information-hiding based RRR/RIR (resource reputation rating/reputation incentive rating) voting model, which awards or punishes voters according to their behaviors. The RRR generating algorithm and the RIR generating algorithm are presented in detail, and the information-hiding mechanism is given. Experimental results showed that the incentive RRR/RIR model can effectively encourage valid voting and prevent malicious or arbitrary voting in the P2P reputation system.
Key words: Peer-to-peer (P2P)    Information-hiding    Incentive    Blank voting    Reputation system
收稿日期: 2009-11-27 出版日期: 2010-12-09
CLC:  TP393  
服务　　
把本文推荐给朋友
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章　　
Bo-wei Yang
Guang-hua Song
Yao Zheng

引用本文:

Bo-wei Yang, Guang-hua Song, Yao Zheng. An incentive model for voting based on information-hiding in P2P networks. Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng., 2010, 11(12): 967-975.

链接本文:

http://www.zjujournals.com/xueshu/fitee/CN/10.1631/jzus.C0910727    或    http://www.zjujournals.com/xueshu/fitee/CN/Y2010/V11/I12/967

[1] Wen-yi Wang, Yao-wu Chen. Is playing-as-downloading feasible in an eMule P2P file sharing system?[J]. Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng., 2010, 11(6): 465-475.
[2] Xiao-song ZHANG, Ting CHEN, Jiong ZHENG, Hua LI. Proactive worm propagation modeling and analysis in unstructured peer-to-peer networks[J]. Front. Inform. Technol. Electron. Eng., 2010, 11(2): 119-129.