[作者简介] 1.姚铮(http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7305-0282),男,浙江大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,主要从事资本市场与投资研究; 2.杨波(http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4916-9942),男,浙江大学管理学院硕士研究生,主要从事风险投资与资本市场研究; 3.胡梦婕(http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1098-7588),女,浙江大学管理学院硕士研究生,主要从事风险投资与资本市场研究。

Research on the Influence of Contract Types on the Growth Performance of Venture Enterprises in the Context of Venture Capital Reputation
Yao Zheng, Yang Bo, Hu Mengjie
School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
Abstract

Venture capital firms normally provide funds or value-added services in exchange for equity in early-stage enterprises that are deemed to have high growth potential. China's venture capital market has seen rapid growth due to policies promoted by the government and it has become the world's second-largest market for venture capital investments after the United States. Thriving as the market is, problems in the relationship between venture capital firms and venture enterprises should not be neglected. As the informed player with the most comprehensive information, venture enterprises have an inborn edge regarding information on venture capital. Since agency risks emerging from asymmetric information often lead to failed investments, contracts are commonly adopted today in stimulating and restraining the activities of venture enterprises.

The paper is based on first-hand research data on venture capital obtained from the questionnaires handed out to a wide range of respondents. The detailed processes and results of the questionnaire will be stated in the text. According to the acquired data, the paper sets an explained variable (i.e. the venture enterprise's growth performance), an explanatory variable (i.e. the contracts — the neo-classical contract and the relational contract) and other control variables, and introduces the factor of venture capital reputation to differentiate among various sample groups. The paper also sets up four regression models based on the research hypotheses by examining four situations where the contracts are either used separately or jointly in the context of a higher or lower reputation. Meanwhile, the paper uses robustness testing to verify the research results. The results of the robustness testing are consistent with those of regression analysis.

The research results show that the neo-classical contract and the relational contract both contribute to company's growth performance when used separately, but the relationship between these two contracts differs in higher or lower reputation. Specifically, the neo-classical contract reduces information asymmetry between venture capital firms and venture enterprises by means of stipulating both parties' responsibilities and duties with the help of detailed contract clauses, while the relational contract facilitates the cooperation between the two parties based on implicit consensuses on roles, responsibilities, company's operation and other topics. Reputation not only reflects venture capital firms' levels of expertise and decision-making ability, but also determines the quality of the invested venture enterprises. From the view of signal theory, venture capital firms with a higher reputation send out a signal that the invested enterprises may have greater potential and reap larger profits. The research indicates that for venture capital firms with a higher reputation, either the neo-classical contract or the relational contract alone can help realize their investment goals thanks to the firms' professional decision-making ability and their high quality. In contrast, for venture capital firms with a lower reputation, their expertise may stay at a low level and the invested enterprise may be of poor quality. Under this circumstance, the combination of neo-classical contracts and relational contracts is conducive to their performance growth on account of the complementary relation between these two forms of contracts.

Instead of focusing on the single contract, this paper delves deeply into different forms of contracts in venture capital and produces comprehensive research results. It proves that both contracts, i.e. neo-classical contract and relational contract, contribute to venture growth. In the meantime, venture capital reputation is introduced as a standard to further study how the various forms of contracts affect the enterprise's growth performance. It is hoped that this research may provide a fresh approach to studying contracts in the field of venture capital.

Keyword: venture capital reputation; contract type; neo-classical contract; relational contract; venture enterprise; growth performance

(一) 风险投资声誉的作用与衡量

(二) 新古典契约和风险企业成长绩效

H1:新古典契约的使用水平与风险企业成长绩效之间存在正相关关系, 即新古典契约的使用能有效促进风险企业的业绩成长。

(三) 关系型契约和风险企业成长绩效

H2:关系型契约的使用水平与风险企业成长绩效之间存在正相关关系, 即关系型契约的使用能有效促进风险企业的业绩成长。

(四) 新古典契约和关系型契约的关系

H3a:对于高声誉风险投资所投项目, 新古典契约与关系型契约在影响风险企业成长绩效的过程中不存在显著的相关关系;

H3b:对于低声誉风险投资所投项目, 新古典契约与关系型契约在影响风险企业成长绩效的过程中存在显著的正相关关系。

(一) 问卷设计和发放

(二) 研究变量

(三) 研究方法和模型

P=β 01NC+∑ β ciCon_Vari+ε (1)

P=β 02RC+∑ β ciCon_Vari+ε (2)

P=β 01NC2RC+β 3NC× RC+∑ β ciCon_Varci+ε (3)

(一) 描述性统计

(二) 相关性分析

(三) 多重共线性和异方差检验

(四) 回归分析

(五) 稳健性检验

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.