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| The Rule-Utilitarianism Dimension of Xunzi’s Ethics: Criticisms, Defence and Limitation |
| Mao Zhaohui |
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Abstract In recent years, scholars have put forward more rigorous arguments to substantiate the utilitarian nature of Xunzi’s ethics. Nevertheless, these arguments have overlooked several counterarguments that contradict their stance, leaving the rigor of their reasoning open to question. These counterarguments mainly originate from Western academia. In general, Western scholars have raised two kinds of criticisms on the utilitarian interpretation of Xunzi’ ethics, which is in general based on his theory of ritual, i.e., the non-consequentialism criticism represented by Eric Hutton and the non-hedonism criticism represented by Heiner Roetz and Paul Goldin. Hutton raises three points of criticism against the consequentialism interpretation of Xunzi’ ethics, that is, uncodifiability, non-necessity, anti-consequentialism. However, these three points do not have their ground in the domain of theory. The non-hedonism criticism of Roetz and Goldin is based on their dichotomy of morality and desire in Xunzi’s theory of human nature. Again, this dualism interpretation of Xunzi’s theory of human nature is a misreading of Xunzi’s concept of righteousness, which leads to the failure of their non-hedonism criticism. Drawing on Anthony Quinton’s definition, utilitarianism can be understood as combination of two fundamental principles: the principle of consequentialism and the principle of hedonism. When measured against these two principles, a rule-utilitarianism interpretation of Xunzi’ ethics is defended in the end. Nevertheless, this rule-utilitarianism interpretation is invulnerable only in the domain of theory and communal life. It is worth noting that despite the above congruences between Xunzi’s ethics and utilitarianism, the two cannot be unconditionally equated entirely. The first limitation is that the utilitarian character of Xunzi’s ethics only holds in the theoretical rather than the practical domain. In other words, Xunzi’s ethics aligns with utilitarian principles only when his concept of li (ritual propriety) refers to the norms of a certain social organization. The second limitation is that Xunzi’s ethics can only be categorized as utilitarianism at the communal rather than the individual level. This is because, in terms of consequences, li as moral norms takes collective interests as its criterion of measurement; and in terms of ends, li as moral norms serves communal objectives instead of individual ones. In short, Xunzi’s rule-utilitarianism is an ethics aimed at establishing objective rules for social life rather than an ethics aimed to guide personal life and can be used to bridge Confucian ethics and utilitarianism. It follows that while Xunzi’s ethics builds a notable bridge between Confucian ethics and utilitarianism, its bridging function cannot be overstated without any limitations.
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Published: 20 June 2026
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