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| On the Selection and Design of Data Governance Rules: From the Perspective of Integrating Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Proportionality Principle |
| Zhang Wei1, Cheng Yuanyuan2, Fan Liangcong3 |
1.School of Law, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
2.Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
3.Jinhua Municipal Bureau of Justice, Jinhua 321000, China |
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Abstract The proper construction of data governance rules is the institutional guarantee for the full implementation of the Digital China strategy. However, intense debates persist regarding their design, centering on how rule construction should respond to the characteristics of data while balancing multiple value objectives. By integrating cost-benefit analysis from economics with the proportionality principle from legal studies, this paper proposes a general framework for rule selection. The framework asserts that rule selection should meet three criteria: direct performance, indirect performance, and overall performance-to achieve an alignment between governance rules and governance needs under value guidance. Within this framework, rule selection can be transformed into the following three progressively rigorous test steps after identifying legitimate objectives: first, testing the degree of alignment between candidate rules and the governance objectives, with the core consideration being whether the selected rule matches the governance structure of the governed object; second, testing whether the candidate rules that pass the first stage minimize the harm among all possible rules, with the core consideration being whether the overall governance costs of the selected rule are the lowest; finally, testing whether the welfare gained by the candidate rules that pass the second stage are proportional to the harm caused, with the core consideration being whether the benefits brought by the selected rule outweigh its costs. In the context of data governance, this framework necessitates distinguishing between data production and data provision, with the focus on promoting data provision. It involves examining whether candidate rules can meet the governance needs of facilitating data provision in terms of effectiveness, while comparing their formulation, implementation, and operational costs. The aim is to identify rules that can balance the triple objectives of fairness, efficiency, and security at a relatively low cost. By analyzing the relationships between delimitation of rights, search, bargaining, security, and provision, the critical requirements of data governance are identified. Guided by the value objectives established in current law and based on the constructed general framework for rule selection, a general framework for rule selection is constructed. This framework distinguishes between non-public data and public data to conduct a comparative performance analysis of various governance rules. For non-public data governance, a path should be established that prioritizes regulatory rules, relies primarily on liability rules, and permits limited application of property rules. For public data governance, a path should be established that focuses on free-access rules, supplements them with price-regulation rules, and allows limited application of licensing rules. When discussing governance rules for emerging phenomena within a mature rule system, the core consideration should focus on adjusting governance rules to align them with governance objectives and needs in a proportionate manner. Therefore, research should neither be confined to the interpretive application of existing legal norms, nor should it simplistically force new concepts into existing legal frameworks. Instead, greater emphasis should be placed on integrating economic analysis with normative analysis. After establishing general criteria for rule selection, the path of rule adjustment under value guidance should be explored. Only in this way can the designed rules both conform to the existing legal system, achieving formal legitimacy, and adapt to the operational logic of the governed objects, meeting the developmental needs of the economy and society, thereby possessing substantive legitimacy.
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Received: 13 July 2025
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2025, Vol. 55 
