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| Trade Restrictive Measures as Unilateral Sanctions |
| Ma Guang |
| Guanghua Law School, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310008, China |
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Abstract International trade restrictive measures are often employed as a significant form of unilateral sanctions. Such measures can be categorized into three types: where the party implementing the measure acknowledges the use of trade restrictive measures based on the intention of unilateral sanctions; where the party denies the existence of the “measure”; and where the party implementing the measure only acknowledges the use of trade restrictive measures based on justifiable reasons such as national security. Regardless of the type, the examination process in WTO disputes remains consistent, focusing solely on whether specific WTO rules have been violated and, if so, whether exceptions can be justified. Therefore, within the current WTO framework, effectively controlling trade restrictive measures implemented for the purpose of unilateral sanctions proves challenging. Furthermore, the broadening interpretation of national security across various countries further complicates the WTO system. What’s more, the current WTO is under tremendous pressure due to the suspension of the Appellate Body, which hampers the dispute settlement mechanism. Additionally, the adoption of panel reports is hindered by malicious appeals, preventing the implementation of legitimate and appropriate retaliatory measures against members imposing unilateral trade sanctions.Starting from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the number of cases involving trade restrictive measures as a form of unilateral sanctions has gradually increased. In recent years, this trend has shown a significant surge in development, posing a serious threat to the international trade order. The imposition and retaliation of trade sanctions have intensified, with unilateral trade sanctions disguised as “legitimate” trade restrictive measures occurring from time to time. In the face of such a serious situation, it is imperative to strictly control national security exceptions, which are often exploited as pretexts for launching unilateral sanctions. At the WTO level, disputes arising from the complexities of such trade disputes have emerged, centered on conflicts like the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, tensions in the Middle East, and trade disputes between China and the United States. Some of these situations have not yet been submitted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, but there is a possibility of their escalation into formal dispute cases. It is very important to analyze these existing cases and explore potential solutions within the framework of the WTO, particularly regarding national security exceptions.China has been subjected to unilateral trade sanctions as a whole, but with the significant growth of its international trade volume, it has sometimes been accused of implementing some of these “measures”. A review of the relevant cases would facilitate the formulation of valuable recommendations on unilateral trade sanctions affecting China. In particular, it may be useful to explore options for prohibiting or limiting unilateral trade sanctions in the form of a general rule. In the long run, it is in our country’s interest to advocate for the restriction or prohibition of such measures as a whole. However, should it prove unfeasible to entirely eradicate these measures or establish a legislative general rule, consideration could also be given to judiciously adopting similar measures against members frequently implementing such measures, thereby offering an effective response.
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Received: 31 October 2023
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2025, Vol. 55 
