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| The Dual Attribute of “Party-State” of General Government Supervision System |
| Lu Zhipeng1, Chen Guoquan2 |
1.School of Public Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
2.School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China |
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Abstract The Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China and the National Supervisory Commission are the most significant specialized supervisory entities within the public power system of contemporary China, both falling under the general government supervision system. Against the backdrop of the mutual integration of discipline inspection and supervision, the general government supervisory organs exercise the “discipline inspection and supervision power”, presenting a three-dimensional structural pattern. They possess the dual “party-state” attributes of discipline inspection and national supervision, shape up a nested organizational foundation that extends horizontally to all aspects and vertically to the grassroots, and set up a general government supervision system led by the Party to construct the public power of the state. Based on the analysis framework of “functional positioning-operation mechanism-target value”, the differences in the Party and state attributes of the general government supervisory organs are compared from aspects such as institutional nature, work basis, supervisory objects, power generation mechanism, responsibility fulfillment mechanism, power exercise mechanism, power subject relationship, and power value orientation. The expression and functional performance of the dual roles of the general government supervisory organs in contemporary China are profoundly influenced by institutional factors. On the one hand, the general government supervision system is intrinsically associated with the overall connection of the “party-state” in contemporary China. This holistic integrated structure also shapes the fundamental relationship of division of labor and connection between the internal Party supervision system and the national supervision system within the supervision system. On the other hand, the dual leadership system is an important organizational principle of the general government supervision system, adjusting the state and party attributes of the general government supervisory organs and the horizontal and vertical “block-strip relationship”. Thus, the integrated construction of the general government supervisory subjects and the dual leadership system directly constitute the most crucial operational logic of the general government supervision system and its dual attribute expression. Meanwhile, with the mutual integration of discipline inspection and supervision of the general government supervisory subjects, the dual attributes of the general government supervisory organs are mutually absorbed and embedded, facilitating the distinct yet collaborative operation of the dual roles of the Commission for Discipline Inspection with the Party attributes and the Supervisory Commission with state attributes, maintaining the internal tension of the system. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the objective political reality reveals that the differences in the Party and state attributes of the general government supervisory organs have not been eliminated due to the integration of the supervisory subject institutions. On the contrary, the dual attributes are concentrated on the same subject, and the attribute tension and role conflict in practical operation may thereby arise. Particularly in the process of the general government supervisory subjects fulfilling the discipline inspection and supervision power, the party attribute has an enhancing effect. The discipline inspection and supervision organs under the unified leadership of the Party have a higher position, and the supervisory function with the state attribute is relatively weakened. This easily leads to the attribute tension and role conflict in the practical performance of duties by the supervisory subjects, which is not conducive to the integration and connection between the internal Party supervision system and the national supervision system within the general government system and may ultimately affect the sustainable effect of corruption governance.
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Received: 08 January 2024
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2024, Vol. 54 
