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| Should China Join the Grains Trade Convention? |
| Kong Qingjiang, Cai Yaqi |
| School of International Law, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China |
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Abstract The world is undergoing great changes unseen in a century. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine ferments the global food supply crisis, which has aroused great concern in the international community. The food crisis has not been resolved, though alleviated with the success of the WTO MC12. China undertook to purchase agricultural products under the China-US Economic and Trade Agreement. The issue of grain trade has thus become a major policy related to China’s fulfillment of international obligations, the prospect of China-US trade relations, as well as national food security. Although China is not only a leading producer of food, but also a major grain trading country in the world, it does not have the corresponding pricing power in grain trade. Accordingly, China is in an awkward position in the international grains market and suffers a lot in the meantime, due to the high concentration and heavy dependence on the sources of grain supply. The grain prices and relationship between grains supply and demand are more sensitive in the international grains market, and the domestic grains market is more vulnerable. Problems such as the tight balance between domestic grains supply and demand and structural contradictions and unreasonable allocation of domestic and foreign grains resources need to be solved urgently. While the WTO Agreement on Agriculture plays a limited role in regulating grains trade, the Grains Trade Convention 1995 provides an opportunity for China to remedy the lack of influence in the international grain market, ensuring food security and promote domestic and international food trade cooperation. Under the current circumstances, the Convention has the unique advantage of stabilizing the grains market and improving its transparency through information sharing, analysis and consultation systems.China’s accession to the Grains Trade Convention has many practical advantages. It is not only out of the necessity to ensure China’s food security and the need to promote China’s food cooperation and trade interests, but a solution for China to deal with the uncertainty of food market. In the context of the expiration of the China-US Economic and Trade Agreement, the impact that China’s fulfilling its purchase commitments may have on the international marketplace for agricultural product is still unknown. The Agreement is in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the provisions of Article 1 of the GATT concerning most-favored-nation treatment, but there is still a risk that it is in disagreement with the provision of Article 11 of GATT concerning general elimination of quantitative restrictions and Article 13 of GATT concerning non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions. From this perspective, the possibility cannot be ruled out that other WTO members might question whether the Agreement disrupts market order and harms other members’ interests. Because of this, the institutional advantages and market influence obtained by acceding to the Grains Trade Convention can correct the negative impression that the Agreement may generate to a considerable extent, and buffer the negative sentiment in the international grains market during and after the Agreement.Overall, China’s accession to the Grains Trade Convention has the legal basis for its compatibility with China’s current laws and policies, as well as alleviating import dependence it may face in the post-pandemic era, which is conducive to scientifically planning on the grain purchase pattern and gaining the pricing power in the international grains trade with the international grain cooperation platform and market opportunities provided by the Convention. At the same time, it should be pointed out that China may face two major challenges after its accession to the Convention. One is the issue of international relations between China and other agricultural trading countries. Conflicts may arise after the expiration of the Agreement. The required grain information disclosure by the information sharing system of the Convention may have an impact on China’s grain security and trade market development.
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Received: 22 July 2021
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2022, Vol. 52 
