契约经济学: 起源、演进及其本土化发展

doi:10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.CN33-6000/C.2016.01.133

Abstract
Figure/Table
References (104)
Related Citation (15)

Download: PDF (1665 KB) HTML (1 KB)
Export: BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)

Abstract

Based on a systematic analysis on the evolution of contract economics, combining with China’s status quo of contract economics research, this paper aims to explore the issues over its application of contract economics in China. Beginning with the evolution of the contract conception, an analysis on the causes of incomplete contract is followed by an examination on the issue of incentive mechanism design under information constraints. Having originated in the religious thoughts of the rights-based contract, the evolution of the connotation of the contract has experienced a transformation from the debtor-creditor agreement in legal contracts, to the norms and informal arrangements in political contracts, and then to the paradigm of transaction analysis in economic contracts. The contract had also become an important category in economic research from the ″outdated legal concept″ in the 1870s. The economic contract lies in taking a step towards repairing the paradigm of the general equilibrium in neoclassical economics, which can be broadly divided into formal and informal contracts, explicit and implicit contracts. Formal contracts and informal contracts tend to be parallel in practice. The choice of contract arrangement is essentially determined by the signing and enforcing costs. The economics of contracts is broadly divided into three main branches: principal-agent theory, transaction cost theory and the property rights theory. These three branches provide explanations for the contract arrangements from the perspective of symmetric allocation of rights, economization of transaction costs and internalization of externalities and risks, respectively. Modern contract is the governance structure regarding contracting parties’ rights and responsibility under the constraint of transaction costs, uncertainty and risks. Bonded rationality and incomplete rationality inevitably lead to contract incompleteness. The matching of exchange and residual rights in incomplete contract is the prerequisite for the achievement of economic efficiency. Comprehensive research of economics of contracts have been conducted in China covering the issues of contract incentive mechanism, connotation of transaction cost, risk allocation and property rights distribution in incomplete contracts. Localization and further development of the economics of contract is facing with the difficulty in the measurement of transaction cost, the lack of research on contract enforcement mechanism, and function of trust and reputation in self-enforcement contract. A market economy is in essence a contract economy, the contract is the institutional foundation to ensure that the market transaction is predictable, stable and reliable More attentions should be given to the issue how to ensure the implementation of the contract through the coordination of formal and informal institutional arrangements, which is the major obstacle to the healthy and orderly development of China’s market economy.

Key words： contract economics evolution incomplete contract localization literature review

	Service

	E-mail this article
	Add to my bookshelf
	Add to citation manager
	E-mail Alert
	RSS
	Articles by authors

TRENDMD:

Cite this article:

URL:

https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/EN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-942X.CN33-6000/C.2016.01.133 OR https://www.zjujournals.com/soc/EN/Y2018/V4/I2/55

[1]	Coase R.H.,″The Nature of the Firm,″ Economica,Vol.16.4(1937), pp.386-405.
[2]	Williamson O.E.,″Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,″ Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.22.2(1979), pp.233-261.
[3]	Williamson O.E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Simon and Schuster International Press, 1985.
[4]	Akerlof G.A.,″The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,″ Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.84.3(1970), pp.488-500.
[5]	Grossman S.J. & Hart O.D.,″The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,″ Journal of Political Economy,Vol.94.4(1986), pp.691-719.
[6]	Coase R.H.,″The Problem of Social Cost,″Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.3(1960), pp.1-44.
[7]	费方域、蒋士成: 《合同理论的范式演进》,见[法]贝尔纳·萨拉尼耶: 《合同经济学》,上海: 上海财经大学出版社,2008年,第1-12页.
	[Fei Fangyu & Jiang Shicheng,″The Paradigm Evolution of Contract Theory,″ in Salanié B., The Economics of Contracts:A Primer,Shanghai:Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2008, pp.1-12.]
	Brousseau E.& Glachant J.M.,″The Economics of Contracts and the Renewal of Economics,″ http://brousseau.info/pdf/EBJMGIntroCUPCont02.pdf, 2016-01-13.
	沈满洪、张兵兵:《交易费用理论综述》,《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,2013年第2期, 第44-58页.
8	[Shen Manhong & Zhang Bingbing,″A Review of the Transaction Cost Theory,″Journal of Zhejiang University(Humanities and Social Sciences), No.2(2013), pp.44-58.]
	姜晓萍、衡霞:《农村土地流转风险的形成机理及外部性研究》,《农村经济》,2011年第11期, 第27-30页.
9	[Jiang Xiaoping & Heng Xia,″Study on the Formation Mechanism and Externality of Rural Land Circulation Risk,″Rural Economy,No.11(2011), pp.27-30.]
[11]	Olson M., The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1965.
[12]	[美]科斯·哈特·斯蒂格利茨等: 《契约经济学》,[瑞典]拉斯·沃因、汉斯·韦坎德编,李风圣译,北京:经济科学出版社,1999年,第1-35页.
	[Stiglize C.H., Contract Economics, edited by Werin L. & Wijkander H., trans. by Li Fengsheng, Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1999, pp.1-35.]
	何怀宏:《契约伦理与社会正义——罗尔斯正义论中的历史与理性》,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1993年.
13	[He Huaihong, Contract Ethics and Social Justice:The History and Reason of Rawls’s Theory of Justice,Beijing:China Renmin University Press, 1993.]
[14]	Maine H.S., Ancient Law:Its Connection with the Early History of Society,and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Miami:HardPress Publishing, 1906.
[15]	陈本寒、马俊驹:《罗马法契约自由思想的形成及对后世法律的影响》,《武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》,1995年第1期, 第65-71页.
	[Chen Benhan & Ma Junju,″The Formation of the Free Contract Thought of Rome Law and Its Influence on the Later Law,″Wuhan University Journal(Philosophy & Social Sciences), No.1(1995), pp.65-71.]
[16]	Macneil I.R., The New Social Contract:An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations,New Haven:Yale University Press, 1980.
[17]	Laffont J.& Martimort D., The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-agent Model,Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2009.
[18]	Adam S., The Wealth of Nations, New York: Modern Library, 1776.
[19]	Babbage C., On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, London: Charles Knight, 1832.
[20]	Cheung S.N., The Theory of Share Tenancy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
[21]	Stiglitz J.E.,″Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping,″ Review of Economic Studies,Vol.41.2(1974), pp.219-255.
[22]	Arrow K.J. & Debreu G.,″Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,″ Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,Vol.22.3(1954), pp.265-290.
[23]	Walras L.,″Elements of Pure Economics, or the Theory of Social Wealth,″ http://img.kb.dk/tidsskriftdk/pdf/nto/nto_0092-PDF/nto_0092_84245.pdf, 2016-01-13.
[24]	Edgeworth F.Y., Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, London: Kegan Paul, 1881.
[25]	Buchanan J.M.,″A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory,″ American Economic Review,Vol.65.2(1975), pp.225-230.
[26]	North D.C., Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.
[27]	Klein B., Crawford R.G. & Alchian A.,″Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,″ Journal of Law & Economics,Vol.21.2(1978), pp.297-326.
[28]	Poppo L.& Zenger T.,″Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?″ Strategic Management Journal,Vol.23.8(2002), pp.707-725.
[30]	Klein B.,″The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-enforcing Relationships,″ Revue Déconomie Industrielle,Vol.92.1(2000), pp.67-80.
[31]	Telser L.G.,″A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements,″ Journal of Business,Vol.53.1(1980), pp.27-44.
[32]	Corts K.S. & Singh J.,″The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling,″ Journal of Law, Economics & Organization,Vol.20.1(2004), pp.230-260.
[33]	Ryall M.D. & Sampson R.C.,″Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects,″ Management Science,Vol.55.6(2009), pp.906-925.
[34]	Kreps D.M. & Wilson R.,″Reputation and Imperfect Information,″ Journal of Economic Theory,Vol.27.2(1982), pp.253-279.
[35]	Prendergast C.,″The Provision of Incentives in Firms,″ Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.37.37(1999), pp.7-63.
[36]	[美]克莱因: 《契约与激励: 契约条款在确保履约中的作用》,见[法]让·米歇尔·格拉尚、埃里克·布鲁索编: 《契约经济学:理论和应用》,北京:中国人民大学出版社,1999年,第184-211页.
	[Klein B.,″Contracts and Incentives:The Role of Contract Terms in Ensuring Compliance,in Brousseau E. & Glachant J.M. (eds.), The Economics of Contracts:Theories and Applications, Beijing: China Renmin University Press The Role of Contract Terms in Ensuring Compliance,″ in Brousseau E. & Glachant J.M. (eds.), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1999, pp.184-211.]
[37]	Macaulay S.,″Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,″ American Sociological Review,Vol.28.1(1963), pp.55-67.
[38]	Klein B.,″Why Hold-ups Occur: The Self-enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships,″ Economic Inquiry,Vol.34.3(1996), pp.444-463.
[39]	[美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿、[德]鲁道夫·芮切特: 《新制度经济学——一个交易费用分析范式》,姜建强、罗长远译,上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2006年.[Furubotn E. & Richter R., New Institutional Economics:A Transaction Cost Analysis Paradigm,trans. by Jiang Jianqiang & Luo Changyuan, Shanghai:Shanghai Joint Publishing Press & Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2006.]
[40]	Salanie B., The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, Cambridge: MIT press, 2005.
[41]	Jensen M.C. & Meckling W.H.,″Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,″ Ssrn Electronic Journal,Vol.3.4(1976), pp.305-360.
[42]	Tirole J.,″Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?″ Econometrica,Vol.67.4(1999), pp.741-781.
[43]	Simon H.A., Administrative Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.
[44]	Hart O.D.,″Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,″ Journal of Law, Economics & Organization,Vol.4.1(1988), pp.119-139.
[45]	Jaffee S.& Morton J. (eds.),Marketing Africa’s High-value Food: Comparative Experiences of an Emergent Private Sector,Dubuque: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, 1995.
[46]	Knight F.H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Pro?t, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.
[47]	Allen D.W. & Lueck D.,″The Role of Risk in Contract Choice,″ Journal of Law, Economics & Organization,Vol.15.3(1999), pp.704-736.
[48]	Joskow P.L.,″Contract Duration and Relationship-specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets,″ American Economic Review,Vol.77.1(1987), pp.168-185.
[49]	Baker G., Gibbons R.& Murphy K.J.,″Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,″ Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.117.1(2002), pp.39-84.
[50]	Greif A.,″Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,″ American Economic Review,Vol.83.3(1993), pp.525-548.
[51]	Uzzi B.,″Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness,″ Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.42.2(1997), pp.35-67.
[52]	Macneil I.R.,″Restatement(Second) of Contracts and Presentation,″Virginia Law Review,No.4(1974), pp.589-610.
[53]	Azariadis C.,″Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria,″ Journal of Political Economy,Vol.83.6(1975), pp.1183-1202.
[54]	Akerlof G.A. & Miyazaki H.,″The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment Meets the Wage Bill Argument,″ Review of Economic Studies,Vol.47.47(1980), pp.321-338.
[55]	Grossman S.J. & Hart O.D.,″Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment,″ American Economic Review,Vol.71.2(1981), pp.301-307.
[56]	Hart O.D.,″Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction,″ Review of Economic Studies,Vol.50.1(1983), pp.3-35.
[57]	Chari V.V.,″Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts,″ Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.98.1(1983), pp.107-122.
[58]	Ackerberg D.A. & Botticini M.,″Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form,″ Journal of Political Economy,Vol.110.3(2002), pp.564-591.
[59]	Harris M.& Raviv A.,″Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information,″ Journal of Economic Theory,Vol.20.2(1979), pp.231-259.
[60]	Davis C.G. & Gillespie J.M.,″Factors Affecting the Selection of Business Arrangements by Hog Farmers U.S.,″ Review of Agricultural Economics,Vol.29.2(2007), pp.331-348.
[61]	Allen D.W. & Lueck D.,″Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts,″ American Economic Review,Vol.85.2(1995), pp.447-451.
[62]	Arrow K.J.,″The Economics of Agency,″ in Pratt J. & Zeckhauser R.(eds.), Principals and Agents:The Structure of Business,Boston:Harvard University Press, 1984, pp.37-54.
[63]	Mirrlees J.,″Notes On Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty,″ in Balch M., McFadden D. & Wu S.(eds.), Essays in Equilibrium Behavior under Uncertainty, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1974, pp.243-261.
[64]	Holmstrom B.& Milgrom P.,″Regulating Trade among Agents,″ Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics,Vol.146.1(1990), pp.85-105.
[65]	Lazear E.P. & Rosen S., ″Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,″ http://www.nber.org/papers/w0401.pdf, 2016-01-13.
[66]	Barzel Y., Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[67]	Hart O. & Moore J., ″Contracts as Reference Points,″ https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.1, 2016-01-13.
[68]	Hart O., Firms, Contracts,Financial Structure, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
[69]	Cheung S.N.,″The Contractual Nature of the Firm,″ Journal of Law & Economics,Vol.26.1(1983), pp.1-21.
[70]	Demsetz H.,″Toward a Theory of Property Rights,″ American Economic Review,Vol.57.2(1967), pp.347-359.
[71]	Allen D.W. & Lueck D.,″Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts,″ Rand Journal of Economics,Vol.24.1(1993), pp.78-100.
[72]	Aghion P.& Bolton P.,″An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting,″ Review of Economic Studies,Vol.59.3(1992), pp.473-494.
[73]	杨明洪:《农业产业化经营组织形式演进:一种基于内生交易费用的理论解释》,《中国农村经济》,2002年第10期, 第11-15页.
	[Yang Minghong,″The Evolution of Agricultural Industrialization Management Organization Form: A Theoretical Explanation Based on Endogenous Transaction Cost,″Chinese Rural Economy,No.10(2002), pp.11-15.]
[74]	杨瑞龙、周业安:《交易费用与企业所有权分配合约的选择》,《经济研究》,1998年第9期, 第30-39页.
	[Yang Ruilong & Zhou Yean,″Transaction Cost and the Choice of the Distribution Contract of Enterprise’s Ownership,″Economic Research Journal,No.9(1998), pp.30-39.]
	罗必良、何一鸣:《博弈均衡、要素品质与契约选择——关于佃农理论的进一步思考》,《经济研究》,2015年第8期, 第162-174页.
75	[Luo Biliang & He Yiming,″Game Equilibrium, Factor Characteristics, and Contractual Choice: An Inquiry into the Share Tenancy Theory,″Economic Research Journal,No.8(2015), pp.162-174.]
[76]	黄少安:《交易费用理论的主要缺陷分析(上)》,《学习与探索》,1996年第4期, 第4-10页.
	[Huang Shaoan,″The Main Defects of Transaction Cost Theory(Ⅰ),″Study & Exploration, No.4(1996), pp.4-10.]
[77]	笪凤媛、张卫东: 《交易费用的含义及测度:研究综述和展望》,《制度经济学研究》2010年第1期,第225页.
	[Da Fengyuan & Zhang Weidong,″The Meaning and Measurement of Transaction Cost: Review and Prospect,″Research of Institutional Economics, No.1(2010), pp.225-241.]
[78]	姜付秀、朱冰、王运通: 《国有企业的经理激励契约更不看重绩效吗?》,《管理世界》2014年第9期,第143页.
	[Jiang Fuxiu, Zhu Bing & Wang Yuntong,″Is Performance Less Valued in the State-owned Enterprise Manager Incentive Contract?″Management World, No.9(2014), pp.143-159.]
[79]	林毅夫、潘士远: 《信息不对称、逆向选择与经济发展》,《世界经济》2006年第1期,第3页.
	[Lin Yifu & Pan Shiyuan,″Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection and Economic Development,″The Journal of World Economy, No.1(2006), pp.3-11.]
[80]	聂辉华:《交易费用经济学:过去、现在和未来——兼评威廉姆森<资本主义经济制度>》,《管理世界》2004年第12期,第146页.
	[Nie Huihua,″Transaction Cost Economics: Past, Present and Future: Review theEconomic Institute of Capitalism by Williamson,″ Management World, No.12(2004), pp.146-153.]
[81]	[澳]杨小凯、黄有光: 《专业化与经济组织——一种新兴古典微观经济学框架》,张玉纲译,北京:经济科学出版社,1999年.
	[Yang Xiaokai & Huang Youguang, Specialization and Economic Organization: A New Classical Microeconomic Framework, trans.by Zhang Yugang, Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1999.]
[82]	汤吉军:《不完全契约视角下国有企业发展混合所有制分析》,《中国工业经济》2014年第12期,第31页.
	[Tang Jijun,″An Analysis of Mixed Ownership Development in State-owned Enterprises: An Imperfect Contract Perspective,″China Industrial Economics, No.12(2014), pp.31-43.]
[83]	王雅娟、范剑飞: 《长期契约的选择:交易还是关系?——基于资产专用性的二维分析框架》,《黑龙江社会科学》2014年第3期,第69页.
	[Wang Yajuan & Fan Jianfei,″The Choice of Long-term Contract: Transaction or Relationship? —A Two-dimensional Analysis Framework Based on Asset Specificity,″Social Sciences in Heilongjiang, No.3(2014), pp.69-72.]
[84]	周雪光:《“关系产权”:产权制度的一个社会学解释》,《社会学研究》2005年第2期,第1页.
	[Zhou Xueguang,″Property Rights as a Relational Concept: A Sociological Approach,″Sociological Studies, No.2(2005), pp.1-31.]
[85]	刘守英:《中国农地制度的合约结构与产权残缺》,《中国农村经济》1993年第2期,第31页.
	[Liu Shouying,″The Contract Structure and Incomplete Property of Farmland System in China,″Chinese Rural Economy, No.2(1993), pp.31-36.]
[86]	姚洋:《中国农地制度:一个分析框架》,《中国社会科学》2000年第2期,第54页.
	[Yao Yang,″China’s Rural Land System: An Analytical Framework,″Social Sciences in China, No.2(2000), pp.54-65.]
[87]	何一鸣、罗必良: 《农地流转、交易费用与产权管制:理论范式与博弈分析》,《农村经济》2012年第1期,第7页.
	[He Yiming & Luo Biliang,″Land Transfer, Transaction Costs and Property Rights Control: A Theoretical Model and Game Analysis,″Rural Economy, No.1(2012), pp.7-12.]
[88]	张五常:《交易费用、风险规避与合约安排的选择》,见[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺思等: 《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海:上海人民出版社,1994年,第137-165页.
	[Zhang Wuchang,″Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements,″ in Coase R., Alchian A. & North D. et al., Property Rights and Institutional Change, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1994, pp.137-165.]
[89]	陆文聪、西爱琴: 《农业产业化中农户经营风险特征及有效应对措施》,《福建论坛(人文社会科学版)》2005年第7期,第83页.
	[Lu Wencong & Xi Anqin,″The Characteristics of Farmers’ Management Risk and Effective Countermeasures in Agricultural Industrialization,″Fujian Tribune, No.7(2005), pp.83-86.]
[90]	Pargal S., Hettige H.& Singh M. et al.,″Formal and Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution: Comparative Evidence from Indonesia and the United States,″ World Bank Economic Review,Vol.11, No3(1997), pp.433-450.
[91]	杨立岩:《合同剩余、剩余控制权与剩余索取权——以山东农村鸭梨“采青”采购合同为例》,《经济评论》2001年第5期,第28页.
	[Yang Liyan,″The Contract Surplus, Residual Control Rights and Residual Claim Rights: Taking Shandong Rural Pear 'Green' Procurement Contract as an Example,″Economic Review, No.5(2001), pp.28-32.]
[92]	Kitts J.A. & Chiang Y.S.,″Norms,″ in V.N.Parrillo, Encyclopedia of Social Problems, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing, 2008, pp.625-626.
[93]	Pretty J.& Ward H.,″Social Capital and the Environment,″ World Development,Vol.29, No2(2001), pp.209-227.
[94]	徐德信、汪国银: 《合约实施理论发展综述》,《安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版)》2010年第1期,第44页.
	[Xu Dexin & Wang Guoyin,″Review of the Development of Contract Enforcement Theory,″Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Social Sciences), No.1(2010), pp.44-47.]
[95]	费孝通:《乡土中国生育制度》,北京: 北京大学出版社, 1998年.[Fei Xiaotong, The Fertility Regimes in Rural China, Beijing: Peking University Press, 1998.]
[96]	王永钦:《市场互联性、关系型合约与经济转型》,《经济研究》2006年第6期,第79页.
	[Wang Yongqin,″Market Interconnection, Relational Contract and Economic Transition,″Economic Research Journal, No.6(2006), pp.79-91.]
[97]	周其仁:《公有制企业的性质》,《经济研究》2000年第11期,第3页.
	[Zhou Qiren,″The Nature of Public-owned Enterprises,″Economic Research Journal, No.11(2000), pp.3-12.]
[98]	万俊毅、欧晓明: 《社会嵌入、差序治理与合约稳定——基于东进模式的案例研究》,《中国农村经济》2011年第7期,第14页.
	[Wan Junyi & Ou Xiaoming,″Social Embeddedness, Differential Governance and Contract Stability: A Case Study on the Mode of the Dongjin,″Chinese Rural Economy, No.7(2011), pp.14-24.]
[99]	亓同惠:《法治中国背景下的“契约式身份”:从理性规制到德性认同》,《法学家》2015年第3期,第1页.
	[Qi Tonghui,″The Contractual Status in the Context of Rule of Law in China: From Rational Regulation to Virtue Identity,″The Jurist, No.3(2015), pp.1-15.]
[100]	Gambetta D.,″Can We Trust Trust,″ in D.Gambetta(ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000, pp.213-237.
[101]	黄再胜、王玉: 《公平偏好、薪酬管制与国企高管激励——一种基于行为合约理论的分析》,《财经研究》2009年第1期,第16页.
	[Huang Zaisheng & Wang Yu,″Fairness Preference, Compensation Regulation and Incentives of Senior Managers in State-owned Enterprises: Based on Behavior Contract Theory,″Journal of Finance and Economics, No.1(2009), pp.16-27.]
[102]	胡军、朱文胜、庞道满: 《劳动契约、交易费用与关系治理——华人家族企业内部治理行为分析》,《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》2002年第3期,第14页.
	[Hu Jun, Zhu Wensheng & Pang Daoman,″Labor Contract, Transaction Cost and Relation Governance: Analysis on Internal Governance Behaviors in Chinese Clan Corporations,″Journal of Jinan University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition), No.3(2002), pp.14-19.]
[103]	Jones N.,″Investigating the Influence of Social Costs and Benefits of Environmental Policies through Social Capital Theory,″ Policy Sciences,Vol.43, No3(2010), pp.229-244.
[104]	Gachter S., B.Herrmann & C.Thoni,″Trust, Voluntary Cooperation, and Socio-economic Background: Survey and Experimental Evidence,″ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,Vol.55, No4(2004), pp.505-531.