Venture capital firms normally provide funds or value-added services in exchange for equity in early-stage enterprises that are deemed to have high growth potential. China's venture capital market has seen rapid growth due to policies promoted by the government and it has become the world's second-largest market for venture capital investments after the United States. Thriving as the market is， problems in the relationship between venture capital firms and venture enterprises should not be neglected. As the informed player with the most comprehensive information， venture enterprises have an inborn edge regarding information on venture capital. Since agency risks emerging from asymmetric information often lead to failed investments， contracts are commonly adopted today in stimulating and restraining the activities of venture enterprises. The paper is based on first-hand research data on venture capital obtained from the questionnaires handed out to a wide range of respondents. The detailed processes and results of the questionnaire will be stated in the text. According to the acquired data， the paper sets an explained variable （i.e. the venture enterprise's growth performance）， an explanatory variable （i.e. the contracts—the neo-classical contract and the relational contract） and other control variables， and introduces the factor of venture capital reputation to differentiate among various sample groups. The paper also sets up four regression models based on the research hypotheses by examining four situations where the contracts are either used separately or jointly in the context of a higher or lower reputation. Meanwhile， the paper uses robustness testing to verify the research results. The results of the robustness testing are consistent with those of regression analysis. The research results show that the neo-classical contract and the relational contract both contribute to company's growth performance when used separately， but the relationship between these two contracts differs in higher or lower reputation. Specifically， the neo-classical contract reduces information asymmetry between venture capital firms and venture enterprises by means of stipulating both parties' responsibilities and duties with the help of detailed contract clauses， while the relational contract facilitates the cooperation between the two parties based on implicit consensuses on roles， responsibilities， company's operation and other topics. Reputation not only reflects venture capital firms' levels of expertise and decision-making ability， but also determines the quality of the invested venture enterprises. From the view of signal theory， venture capital firms with a higher reputation send out a signal that the invested enterprises may have greater potential and reap larger profits. The research indicates that for venture capital firms with a higher reputation， either the neo-classical contract or the relational contract alone can help realize their investment goals thanks to the firms' professional decision-making ability and their high quality. In contrast， for venture capital firms with a lower reputation， their expertise may stay at a low level and the invested enterprise may be of poor quality. Under this circumstance， the combination of neo-classical contracts and relational contracts is conducive to their performance growth on account of the complementary relation between these two forms of contracts.Instead of focusing on the single contract， this paper delves deeply into different forms of contracts in venture capital and produces comprehensive research results. It proves that both contracts， i.e. neo-classical contract and relational contract， contribute to venture growth. In the meantime， venture capital reputation is introduced as a standard to further study how the various forms of contracts affect the enterprise's growth performance. It is hoped that this research may provide a fresh approach to studying contracts in the field of venture capital．