Chen Wenqiang1, Mao Xiaonan1, Wu Aiqi2, Jia Shenghua2
1.School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China 2.School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
Abstract:Investment-financing maturity mismatch (hereinafter referred to as “IFM mismatch”) happens when a firm uses short-term debt to fund long-term investments. This mismatch behavior not only amplifies corporate financial risks but may also spread across the entire financial system, triggering systemic financial risks. Therefore, managing corporate IFM mismatch serves as the micro foundation for preventing and mitigating systemic financial risks. Long-term funding shortage and principal-agent conflicts are the two main underlying factors causing corporate IFM mismatches. “Specialized, refined, differentiated, innovative” enterprises (hereinafter referred to as “SRDI” enterprises), which focus on niche markets and play a key role in industrial chains, are vital for developing new productive forces and building a modern industrial system. However, due to their small scale, low social recognition, imperfect governance mechanisms and high R&D activities, SRDI enterprises face severe resource limitations and agency problems, resulting in significant IFM mismatches. To cultivate a group of high-quality small and medium-sized enterprises with international competitiveness, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology initiated the selection and cultivation of SRDI “little giants” in 2019. Research has confirmed that this policy fundamentally impacts investment and financing decisions of selected firms by shaping their resource and governance environments. However, few studies have examined the policy’s economic effects from the perspective of IFM mismatch. Whether this policy can resolve the resource and governance issues of SRDI enterprises and thus alleviate IFM mismatch remains an unexplored critical question.Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2023, this paper uses PSM based staggered DID to investigate the impact of SRDI “little giants” cultivation policy on corporate IFM mismatch. The research results show that the implementation of SRDI “little giants” cultivation policy significantly reduces enterprises’ degree of IFM mismatch. The mechanism test shows that resource empowerment and governance empowerment are the potential channels. From the perspective of resource empowerment channels, the policy reduces IFM mismatch by increasing government subsidies, long-term credit and equity financing. From the perspective of governance empowerment channels, the policy reduces IFM mismatch by reducing the agent cost, alleviating the management myopia and improving social concern. Heterogeneity tests indicate that the policy’s effect is more pronounced in regions with higher local government responsiveness, industries with higher “little giant” density, and enterprises with higher R&D intensity. Economic consequence tests show that the policy further reduces corporate financial risks and improves investment efficiency by curbing IFM mismatch.This study is of great theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, it extends research on the economic consequences of SRDI “little giants” cultivation policy and the determinants of corporate IFM mismatches. Practically, it offers empirical evidences for further advancing SRDI “little giants” cultivation policy and provides useful policy references to address corporate IFM mismatches and thus preventing systemic financial risks.