Abstract：This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the public prosecution system reform under the forthcoming fourth amendment to China’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). Drawing upon historical evolution, comparative perspectives, and empirical evidence, it aims at proposing a systematic blueprint for improving the prosecutorial mechanism in China. The author identifies three institutional areas where long-standing problems have emerged through decades of judicial practice: the system of supplementary investigation (or supplementary inquiry), the system of leniency for confession and plea (RNR), and the system of non-prosecution. The study argues that any reform of the public prosecution regime must adhere to three fundamental procedural principles—protection of human rights, legality of procedure, and primacy of justice—to achieve a dynamic balance between state prosecution power and individual rights.Methodologically, the paper adopts a historical, comparative and empirical approach. Historically, it traces the legislative evolution of the CPL since 1979, identifying three major trends in prosecutorial reform: a shift from “punishment‐oriented” to “punishment & protection”, a structural transition from the inquisitorial to a hybrid model emphasizing adversarial elements, and a progression from “cooperation over restriction” to “enhanced procedural supervision”. In comparative analysis, the author contrasts China’s institutional design with that of Germany, France, Canada, and the United States, highlighting the hybrid configuration of Chinese prosecutorial and investigative powers, which necessitates a unique design for supplementary investigation procedures. Empirically, the study synthesizes normative documents and prosecutorial practice data to provide targeted legislative recommendations.The paper’s innovations are concentrated in three major domains:1. Reforming the supplementary investigation system. The study emphasizes clarifying the division of authority among public security organs, procuratorates, and supervisory commissions, while introducing a “legal checklist” that specifies situations where cases should not be returned for reinvestigation. It proposes institutionalizing this list within the CPL to curb abuse of discretionary power and to mandate written investigation outlines with explicit evidentiary objectives. A “joint meeting and evaluation mechanism” between police and prosecutors is recommended to visualize and assess the results of supplementary investigation. For corruption cases investigated by supervisory commissions, the author suggests codifying prosecutors’ supervisory authority over evidence legality and guaranteeing defense counsel’s participation during supplementary inquiry—thus bridging the procedural gap between supervision and prosecution.2. Expanding and refining the non-prosecution system. The paper advocates extending conditional non-prosecution beyond juvenile offenders to include adult offenders in minor cases, thereby creating a dual-structure mechanism. It calls for loosening the limitations on applicable offenses and penalties, and for strengthening the supervision and education components through community-based electronic monitoring. Additionally, the study introduces a victim participation framework that institutionalizes three mechanisms: (a) mandatory response to victims’ opinions before a non-prosecution decision, (b) legal aid access for victims lacking professional representation, and (c) judicial review rights if prosecutors violate procedural duties. These measures aim at enhancing transparency, accountability, and restorative justice within prosecutorial discretion.3. Improving the leniency for confession and plea (RNR) system. The author underscores the necessity of strengthening legal aid in serious felony cases. It is proposed that defendants facing potential imprisonment of over three years must be provided with mandatory legal assistance. To enhance the fairness and credibility of sentencing recommendations, the paper advocates establishing an interactive negotiation mechanism between prosecution and defense, requiring prosecutors to hold public consultation sessions before finalizing sentencing proposals and prohibiting arbitrary adjustments afterward. Furthermore, the paper proposes empowering duty lawyers with full access to case files, visitation rights, and written opinion submissions, ensuring their substantive participation rather than a merely symbolic role.In essence, this paper’s originality lies in embedding a prosecutorial reform within the broader context of China’s supervisory system transformation and judicial modernization. It not only diagnoses procedural weaknesses but also provides legislatively operable solutions for the 2024 amendment. The proposed model envisions a modern prosecutorial framework that integrates procedural legality, substantive justice, and institutional efficiency, allowing the procuratorate to function as both a “quality inspector” and “filter” of the criminal justice process. The ultimate objective is to ensure that every criminal case in China is prosecuted or dismissed under a transparent, fair, and human-rights–oriented legal regime.
陈光中. 《刑事诉讼法》再修改背景下公诉制度的完善[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2025, 55(10): 5-20.
Chen Guangzhong. The New Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law: Toward Perfection of the Public Prosecution System. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2025, 55(10): 5-20.
2025, Vol. 55 
