In China, environmental problems are still serious. In litigation for environmental public interest, the number of lawsuits filed by social organizations has not increased significantly. Firstly, organizations of environmental protection are under heavy work and financial pressure. The litigation for environmental public interest is characterized by high appraisal cost and heavy workload. In litigation for environmental public interest, a lot of work needs to be done from accepting cases to suing. Secondly, the reward system for the plaintiffs is inadequate when they win the lawsuit. Thirdly, the fund system of the litigation for environmental public interest is not perfect. In this regard, we can learn from the experience of other countries according to China’s actual situation. The incentive mechanism of the United States is relatively sound, as it includes transfer of lawyer fee, the compensation system for appraisal fee of experts, the system of bounty hunter and fund from litigation for environmental public interest and other incentive measures. The ″Investigation Committee″ of Germany is an organization appointed by the court to investigate such cases, which greatly reduces the cost of the plaintiff to collect evidence. In addition, if the plaintiff proves that he cannot afford the costs of litigation, he can apply to the court to limit the litigation costs to a very low level. To establish the incentive mechanism of social organizations to file litigation for environmental public interest, we must improve the system of fund and relief measures. The sources of the funds include damages and the support from government, value-added funds and other ways. For example, some scholars suggest using the lottery of environmental protection to raise funds for litigation of public interest. Since sports lottery and welfare lottery can absorb a lot of money, it is also practicable and acceptable that an environmental lottery can do so. The fund will be used mainly to restore the ecological environment, pay costs of litigation and reward successful environmental organizations. Public trust can be authorized to manage the fund. The government that allocates funds and individuals or groups that make donations to the fund can act as trustees. In this way, the transparency of the use for funds can be enhanced. The scope of payment should be specified, and the rules of maximum payment should be limited. In addition, organizations should be set up to supervise interior fund according to the law. Incorporating lawyers’ fees into the system of insurance can not only relieve the economic pressure of social organizations in their litigation for public interest, but also guarantee the payment of the lawyers’ fees, thus encouraging more lawyers to participate in the litigation for environmental public interest. The lawyers of public interest aim to safeguard public interests and provide professional legal services for litigation of environmental public interest. We must improve the system of legal aid. In addition, we must pay attention to the issue of strengthening the safety protection of litigants for environmental public interest. It is vital to increase transparency and let the general public exercise supervision. A necessary concern is that social organizations may worry about what to do if environmental lawsuits fail like other common lawsuits, in which the losing party bears the costs. Therefore, in the litigation for environmental public interest, the rules of payment for litigation costs should be different from the general rules. Another possible solution is to change the acceptance fees of litigation for environmental public interest into payment by pieces, which conforms to the requirements from the rules of litigation, and does not put too much pressure on the plaintiff.
郭雪慧. 社会组织提起环境民事公益诉讼研究---以激励机制为视角[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2019, 5(3): 214-.
Guo Xuehui. Research on the Incentive Mechanism for Social Organizations to File Environmental Public Interest Litigation. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2019, 5(3): 214-.