quinas' account of singular sensory and universal intellectual representation is crucial in one of his main arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. However， it had been challenged by Scotus， Ockham and Buridan.I argue that their objections to Aquinas' account are untenable. I also show that，contrary to what Robert Pasnau claims， Aquinas' argument does not have to commit “the content fallacy.” Finally， I explain why Buridan has to accept the main implication of Aquinas' argument， even though he actually rejects that implication．
［美］久拉·克里马. 从语义学到心灵哲学： 重思对阿奎那关于理智之非物质性论证的一些批评[J]. 浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版), 2016, 2(3): 60-.
Gyula Klima. From Semantics to the Philosophy of Mind: Reconsidering Some Late-Medieval and Modern Critiques of Aquinas' Argument for the Immateriality of the Intellect from the Universality of Concepts. JOURNAL OF ZHEJIANG UNIVERSITY, 2016, 2(3): 60-.