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浙江大学学报（理学版）
浙江大学学报（理学版）  2018, Vol. 45 Issue (2): 188-195    DOI: 10.3785/j.issn.1008-9497.2018.02.009
管理科学     
融入再审核的PPP项目动态绩效激励机制研究
张宏, 乔文珊
浙江大学 建筑与工程学院, 浙江 杭州 310058
Research on the dynamic performance incentive mechanism incorporated with re-examination of PPP project
ZHANG Hong, QIAO Wenshan
College of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China
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摘要： 基于政府角度探讨了针对PPP项目社会资本方的动态绩效激励机制，运用委托代理理论构建PPP项目绩效激励模型，包括静态绩效激励模型和融入再审核的两阶段动态绩效激励模型.同时，对社会资本方最优努力水平、政府效益最优化、再审核周期，以及绩效标准、奖罚系数、政府补贴等激励参数进行了分析，解释了政府的社会、经济、综合效益的影响因素，提出了优化建议.最后，通过案例展开数值分析，证明融入再审核的动态绩效激励机制能够实现综合效益的最大化.旨在为政府科学确定PPP项目运营阶段的绩效激励机制及再审核周期提供理论依据和决策支持.
关键词： 政府和社会资本合作模式(PPP);  绩效激励;  再审核;  动态调整    
Abstract: The paper explores the dynamic performance drive mechanism for the private sector of the public-private-partnership (PPP) project from the government perspective, and constructs the performance incentive model by applying the principal-agent theory,including the static performance incentive model and the two-stage dynamic performance incentive model incorporated with re-examination. Meanwhile,the analyses on the optimal effort level of private sector,maximization of government benefit,period of re-examination as well as adjustment of the incentive parameters such as performance standards,coefficient of rewards and government subsidy are carried out,thus explaining the influential factors to the social,economic and comprehensive benefits of the government and proposing suggestions for optimization. The numerical analyses based on a case study illustrate that dynamic performance incentive model incorporated with re-examination is able to achieve maximization of the comprehensive benefit. The study is aimed to provide the government sector with the theoretical foundation and support when making decisions on the performance incentive mechanism and period of re-examination during the operation of the PPP project.
Key words: public-private-partnership (PPP)    performance incentive    re-examination    dynamic adjustment
收稿日期: 2017-04-05 出版日期: 2018-03-08
CLC:  C939  
基金资助: 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目（博导类项目）（20130101110058）.
作者简介: 张宏(1963-),ORCID:http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5408-4292,男,博士,教授,主要从事建设工程管理系统仿真研究,E-mail:jgzhangh@zju.edu.cn.
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引用本文:

张宏, 乔文珊. 融入再审核的PPP项目动态绩效激励机制研究[J]. 浙江大学学报（理学版）, 2018, 45(2): 188-195.

ZHANG Hong, QIAO Wenshan. Research on the dynamic performance incentive mechanism incorporated with re-examination of PPP project. Journal of ZheJIang University(Science Edition), 2018, 45(2): 188-195.

链接本文:

https://www.zjujournals.com/sci/CN/10.3785/j.issn.1008-9497.2018.02.009    或    https://www.zjujournals.com/sci/CN/Y2018/V45/I2/188

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